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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-1385 
________________ 
 
CHUN YAO LIN, 
                     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                                                                          
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A200-174-211)  
Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley 
 ______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2018 
 ______________ 
 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  August 20, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Chun Yao Lin petitions for review of the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal of the IJ’s 
decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review.  
 The Attorney General may grant asylum to a refugee who can show that he is 
unable or unwilling to return to his country because of a “well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”1 To establish such a fear, the refugee must demonstrate both 
a subjective, genuine fear of persecution and, “objectively, that ‘a reasonable person in 
the alien’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to the country in question.’”2 
To satisfy the objective prong, the refugee “must show she would be individually singled 
out for persecution or demonstrate that ‘there is a pattern or practice in his or her country 
of nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant 
on account of[,]’” inter alia, “religion.”3   
                                              
 
 
1 Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 534–35 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A)).  
2 Id. at 536 (quoting Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
3 Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)). 
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The standard for withholding of removal is similar to, but higher than, the standard 
for asylum.4 Accordingly, any petitioner who fails to satisfy the standard for asylum 
necessarily cannot meet the standard for withholding of removal.5 
Finally, an applicant who seeks to remain in the United States under the CAT must 
establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the 
proposed country of removal.”6 Torture is defined as 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act 
he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.7 
 
After reviewing this record, we are satisfied that the BIA’s denial of the petition 
for relief is supported by substantial evidence.8  Petitioner has not established that he 
                                              
 
 
4 Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 
329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
5 Id. (quoting Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 182). 
6 Id. at 325 (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 172 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
7 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 
8 See Shardar, 382 F.3d at 323 (“Whether a petitioner has demonstrated past persecution 
or a well-founded fear of future persecution is a factual question that is reviewed by this 
Court under a substantial evidence standard, and will be upheld to the extent it is 
supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a 
whole.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). The scope of review under the 
substantial evidence standard is narrow, and we will not disturb the conclusions of the 
BIA “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Id. 
(quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
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would be singled out for his Christian beliefs or that he would be subjected to a pattern or 
practice of persecution. He could not identify a church he would attend in China, there 
was no evidence in the record of persecution towards Christians in his home province, 
and even the reports he relied upon indicate that membership in “unregistered” churches 
is “tacitly approved of” in certain areas of the country.9 We also agree that Petitioner has 
not demonstrated that he would proselytize when he returned to China as there is 
insufficient proof of his proselytization efforts in the United States.10  
Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown he identified evidence 
compelling a conclusion that he will be subject to persecution or torture, and we will 
therefore deny the petition for review of the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of 
relief.  
                                              
 
 
9 JA 244. 
10 Lin asserts that the BIA and IJ incorrectly discounted his testimony despite finding him 
credible. We disagree. Although the IJ found that Lin was credible “in a general sense,” 
JA 71, he also concluded that much of Lin’s testimony was not substantiated. See, e.g., 
JA 72–73.  
